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 Using unique longitudinal administrative tax panel data for the District of Columbia (DC), we 
assess the combined effect of the DC supplemental earned income tax credit (EITC) and the federal EITC 
on poverty and income dynamics within Washington, DC, from 2001 to 2011. The EITC in DC merits 
investigation, as the DC supplement to the federal credit is the largest in the nation. The supplemental DC 
EITC was enacted in 2000, and has been expanded from 10 percent of the federal credit in 2001 to 40 
percent as of 2009. To implement the study, we estimate least squares models with 0/1 dependent 
variables to estimate the likelihood of net-EITC income above poverty and near-poverty thresholds. We 
also estimate the likelihood of earnings growth and income stabilization from the EITC. To identify the 
effect of the EITC, we exploit variation in the EITC subsidy rate from 2008 to 2009, when an additional 
EITC bracket of 45 percent was added for workers with three or more dependent children, up from 40 
percent in the previous year for workers with two or more children. We also estimate a model examining 
the impact of city-level changes to the EITC. The structure and richness of our data enable us to control 
for tax filer fixed effects, an important innovation from many previous EITC studies. Overall, we find that 
the combined EITC raises the likelihood of net-EITC income above poverty and near poverty by as much 
as 9 percent, with the largest consistent effects accruing to single-parent families.  
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Twenty-five states and Washington, D.C. (DC), have supplemented the federal Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC) with their own state EITCs (Ben-Shalom, Moffitt, and Scholz 2012; 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2015). The EITC is currently the nation’s largest federal 
cash transfer program for low- and moderate-income working families, and the DC EITC, equal 
to 40 percent of the federal EITC, is the largest state or local supplement to the federal EITC in 
the country (Clark 2008); for DC participants, this translates to the largest total refundable EITC. 
As states and local jurisdictions consider policies to raise after-tax and transfer incomes among 
the working poor and near poor, there is limited information on the combined antipoverty 
effectiveness of local and federal EITCs (Guzman, Pirog, and Seefeldt 2013; Nichols and 
Rothstein, forthcoming), and no evidence on the impact of the EITC in DC on the longer-term 
poverty status or economic well-being of its residents.  
To address this gap, our study uses DC administrative municipal tax data to examine the 
effect of the federal EITC combined with the DC supplemental EITC on poverty and income 
dynamics between 2001 and 2011. In DC, almost 20 percent of residents lived at or below 
poverty in 2011, well above the national poverty rate of approximately 15 percent (DeNavas-
Walt and Proctor 2014). Adopting a definition of net-EITC income equal to federal adjusted 
gross income (FAGI) plus the DC and federal EITC, we find that the EITC lowers exposure to 
poverty and near poverty both one and two years after receipt. The EITC in DC also reduces 
negative income instability when income falls among residents, and city-level EITC expansions 
throughout the 2000s appear to have reduced poverty. Poverty reductions are strongest for 
single-parent households, raising their chances of remaining above 100, 125, and 150 percent of 
the poverty line by 2, 7, and 9 percent, respectively.  
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Single parents represent an important demographic group for poverty policy. Nationwide, 
throughout the 2000s roughly 30 percent of single parent, female-headed families are below 
poverty in any given year, and over 50 percent of poor children reside in single-parent, female-
headed families (DeNavas-Walt and Proctor 2014). We identify the effect of the EITC within the 
city for single-parent and married-parent families by exploiting a policy change in the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), wherein a new EITC category for workers with three 
or more children was established at 45 percent in 2009. For working families with three or more 
children, this is a 5 percentage point increase from the 2001–2008 subsidy, when families with 
two or more dependent children shared the top phase-in earnings subsidy rate of 40 percent. The 
poverty results are robust for single-parent families and for married families up to 125 percent of 
the poverty line; the income instability results are robust for married families. Importantly, the 
structure and richness of our data enable us to control for tax filer fixed effects, an important 
innovation from many previous EITC studies.   
OVERVIEW OF THE EITC  
The federal EITC supplements a proportion of earnings through the tax system. 
Originally designed to reduce the tax burden facing low-income workers and their families in 
1975, the program now operates as the nation’s largest cash transfer program for the poor and 
near poor. EITC refunds are calculated as a share of earnings up to an annually established 
maximum, with eligibility varying by marital status, adjusted gross income, and the number of 
child dependents (Marr et al. 2014; Nichols and Rothstein, forthcoming). The subsidy or “phase-
in” rate replaces anywhere from 7 cents on each dollar earned for qualifying workers without 
children to 45 cents on each dollar earned for qualifying workers with three or more children as 
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of 2009. The DC EITC emerged as the largest supplement to the federal credit in the nation 
(Kerstetter 2008) after undergoing three rate increases, as well as eligibility expansions since 
enactment in 2000 (Lakin and Lazere 2002) (see Table 1), and is calculated as a fixed percentage 
of the federal EITC. Since 2009 the DC EITC is equivalent to 40 percent of the federal credit, 
and participation in both the DC and federal EITC has been on the rise since the early 2000s. 
Further elevating the importance of this program are persistently low and stagnant earnings 
among less-educated U.S. workers over the last 10 years or more (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 
2008; Autor 2014; Berlin 2007; Blank 2008; Hardy, Smeeding, and Ziliak 2015; Nichols and 
Rothstein, forthcoming; Shaefer and Edin 2013).  
Several studies estimate a range of social and economic benefits from EITC receipt. 
These include increased employment (Bishop, Heim, and Mihaly 2009; Bollinger, Gonzales, and 
Ziliak 2009; Chetty, Friedman, and Saez 2012; Eissa and Hoynes 2004; Hotz and Scholz 2003; 
Meyer 2002; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001) and lowered welfare participation (Grogger 2004), 
improved educational achievement (Dahl and Lochner 2012), higher net income and liquidity 
(Bitler, Hoynes, and Kuka 2014; LaLumia 2013; Smeeding, Ross Phillips, and O’Connor 2000), 
and lowered poverty (Gundersen and Ziliak 2004; Neumark and Wascher 2001), particularly 
among families headed by single mothers. Many of these studies focus on policy changes and 
expansions to the federal EITC during the 1980s and 1990s, including the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 as well as the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of both 1990 and 1993. No previous 
EITC studies have, to our knowledge, accounted for both state supplements (Cancian and 
Levinson 2006; Neumark and Wascher 2001) and the federal EITC to assess poverty using 
administrative tax data. 
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The program’s design creates offsetting income and substitution effects, so that a given 
worker may respond to additional income from supplemented wages by working additional, 
fewer, or the same number of hours (Cancian and Levinson 2006). Regarding the relationship 
between the EITC and poverty in DC, ambiguous theoretical labor supply effects and stagnant 
wages among lower-skilled workers (Hardy, Smeeding, and Ziliak 2015; Grusky et al. 2013) 
make it unclear ex ante whether the combined DC and federal EITC raises or lowers the 
likelihood of poverty or near-poverty status on a longer-term basis (Scholz 1994). 
LOCAL SPENDING AND DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF THE EITC IN DC 
 DCs EITC policy is part of an income tax system that is among the most progressive in 
the nation, directing resources toward low-income residents to a greater degree than most other 
states and localities (Davis et al. 2015). Although the city experienced a financial crisis 
throughout the early to middle 1990s, municipal revenues have grown since the late 1990s, 
providing the flexibility to enact such a policy. This growth was spurred in large part by 
population growth from the late 1990s through 2013, including the arrival of roughly 1,000 new 
residents per month from 2007 to 2013. Accordingly, city spending rose alongside population 
and revenue growth over this period, from $3.6 billion in 2002 to $5.8 billion in 2011, slowed 
somewhat by the recession in 2007 (Gandhi, Spaulding, and McDonald, forthcoming). The DC 
supplemental EITC was enacted in 2000 at the onset of population and revenue growth, at 10 
percent credit of the federal EITC. In Figure 1 we show that spending on the DC supplemental 
EITC doubled from $21 million in 2001 to $52 million by 2011, driven largely by increases to 
the size of the local credit as a function of the federal EITC, up to 25 percent in 2002, 35 percent 
in 2006, and 40 percent by 2009 (see Table 1). Distributionally, the largest proportion of the 
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city’s EITC expenditure accrues to the third quintile of EITC recipients (see Figure 2), with 
mean earnings of approximately $15,000. This is by design and consistent with the federal EITC 
schedule, within the range at which the EITC benefit reaches its maximum value. This raises 
policy implications regarding the possibilities and limitations for the program as an antipoverty 
strategy for workers with earnings closer to or further from the official poverty threshold. For 
example, residents experiencing jobless spells will not benefit from the EITC if their earnings are 
nonexistent throughout the calendar year.  
 We begin our assessment of the EITC in DC by conducting a set of “point-in-time” 
estimates of poverty reduction from the federal and DC EITC, shown in Table 2. In this exercise, 
we depict the percent reduction in poverty and near poverty, examining the proportion of DC tax 
filers reporting FAGI at or below 100, 125, and 150 percent of the federal poverty threshold. 
Next, we recalculate this number and share after accounting for net-EITC income, equal to total 
federal and DC EITC benefits received in addition to FAGI. Moving across Table 2, we find that 
the percent reduction in poverty is 37 percent for single filers and 16 percent for married filers 
when accounting for the “full” DC and federal EITC together. An intermediate definition of 
near-poverty, 125 percent of the poverty threshold, yields net-EITC poverty reductions of 25 
percent for single filers and nearly 10 percent for married filers. We then observe that a second 
near-poverty rate, at or below 150 percent of the federal poverty threshold, is reduced by 16 
percent for single parents and 5 percent for married families filing jointly. Data on the DC and 
federal EITC allow us to demonstrate the immediate antipoverty effect, or lack thereof, from a 
significantly larger net-EITC benefit driven by the largest local EITC in America. Although this 
point-in-time exercise suggests meaningful poverty reductions, it leaves unanswered a larger 
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policy question: do significantly larger EITCs yield longer-term antipoverty benefits beyond 
immediate income maintenance?  
ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF THE EITC 
 To estimate the longer-term antipoverty effects of the combined DC and federal EITC, 
we exploit a policy change in the 2009 ARRA. The size of the Great Recession and financial 
crisis motivated the ARRA, an $833 billion fiscal stimulus of spending programs and tax cuts 
(Congressional Budget Office 2012). In 2009, the recovery act established a new federal EITC 
phase-in rate for families with three or more children of 45 percent, a 5 percentage point increase 
from the 2001–2008 subsidy for this group, when families with two or more dependent children 
shared the top phase-in subsidy rate of 40 percent (Tax Policy Center 2014). This jump in the 
EITC rate for families with three or more children introduces variation in the size of the EITC 
benefit over time by family size, both across the country and for DC residents. This variation in 
the level of benefits over time allows for estimation of a plausibly causal effect of the EITC on 
the margin (Hotz and Scholz 2003; Ziliak 2013). Across married and head of household filers, 
eligibility for the EITC is determined by income level and the number of child dependents; the 
natural experiment design arises from the above-mentioned 2009 ARRA policy change. 
Together, these three indicators identify the effect of the combined DC and federal EITC. This 
differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) estimator (Gruber 1994) is appropriate in 
scenarios like the one presented by the ARRA, where government policy is altered in a way that 
is unlikely to be anticipated by program participants given the complexity of the tax code (Meyer 
1995; Tach and Halpern-Meekin 2014; Yelowitz 1995). We use least squares to estimate the 
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effects of the combined DC and federal EITC on the probability of net-EITC income above 
poverty, income growth, and income stabilization. More formally, 
(1) 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑘 ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑘𝑘=3𝑘=1 + 𝛾𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴 + 𝜇𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴 × 𝐸𝑖𝑡 
+𝜌𝐸𝑖𝑡 × ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑘𝑘=3𝑘=1 + 𝜎𝐷𝑖3 × 𝐸𝑖𝑡 × 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴 + 𝝉𝑿𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a 0/1 dichotomous dependent variable reflecting net-EITC income (FAGI plus 
federal EITC plus DC EITC) above poverty in either year t + 1 or years t + 1 and t + 2, or  
income dynamics. We estimate separate regression models for tax filing units that are either 
married filing jointly or head of household, referring to married filing jointly as “married” and 
head of household as “single” parents (Smeeding, Ross Phillips, and O’Connor 2000). With 
respect to income dynamics, earnings growth is a 0/1 indicator for whether or not the increased 
combined EITC induces higher earnings, and income instability is a 0/1 indicator for whether or 
not negative year-over-year percent FAGI changes are buffered after accounting for net-EITC 
income. 𝐸𝑖𝑡 indicates EITC eligibility for tax filer i in year t as defined by the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS)–published adjusted gross income thresholds for the program; 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴 represents the 
time period of the ARRA and beyond spanning 2009 to 2011; ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑘𝑘=3𝑘=1  are a set of separate 
indicator variables for tax filer i with one, two, or three or more dependents as of 2008, with tax 
filers reporting zero dependents as the omitted group; 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴 × ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑘𝑘=3𝑘=1  depicts three separate 
interactions of the recovery act time period with the aforementioned indicators for tax filers 
reporting one to three dependents, respectively; 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴 × 𝐸𝑖𝑡 is the interaction of the recovery act 
time period with EITC eligibility status; 𝐸𝑖𝑡 × ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑘𝑘=3𝑘=1  depicts three separate interactions of 
EITC eligibility status for tax filer i in time t with indicators for tax filers reporting one to three 
dependents; and, 𝐷𝑖3 × 𝐸𝑖𝑡 × 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴 represents the main policy variable of interest, capturing the 
effect of the combined DC and federal EITC via the interaction of tax filers reporting three or 
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more dependent children as of 2008 with EITC eligibility during the 2009–2011 recovery act 
period. 𝑿𝑡 represents the following vector of city-level time varying economic and policy 
variables: unemployment rate, food insecurity, gross state product, family-size specific combined 
welfare cash and Food Stamp benefits, and the level of the city’s minimum wage. 𝜑𝑖 accounts 
for tax filer fixed effects to compensate for the dearth of demographic data within the 
administrative tax panel. 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a random error term for tax filer i in year t. Finally, we cluster 
standard errors on tax filer identifiers.  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ADMINISTRATIVE TAX DATA  
 The data used in this study come from individual income tax (IIT) records for DC tax 
filers between 2001 and 2011. The tax data include all information regarding income, taxes, 
exemptions, and other tax-related variables for individuals who filed in a given year. We use 
unique identifiers for tax filers across years, and in the course of constructing the IIT panel data 
we discovered that a small share of filers submit multiple tax returns within a year, creating 
duplicates in the data. In order to facilitate construction of a panel data set, we drop all tax 
returns for each filer after the first observed return, dropping 3,485 duplicate observations. All 
dollar denominated values in the analysis are adjusted using the personal consumption 
expenditures deflator (PCE) for 2010.   
Eligibility for the EITC is determined by comparing FAGI to IRS income thresholds for 
EITC eligibility based on marital status and the number of dependent children. U.S. federal 
poverty thresholds are determined in a similar manner, based on overall family size and number 
of dependent children. To link this external data to our tax file, we use the number of dependents 
along with information on whether the filer is defined as married filing jointly, indicating a two-
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parent household, or head of household, indicative of a single-parent household, to construct a 
measure of family size. We then use this family size variable to link the tax data with annual 
weighted average poverty thresholds from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), and we use number of dependents and filing status to merge IRS data containing EITC 
thresholds. We use number of dependents as a proxy for child dependents, and the use of 
weighted average poverty thresholds is an acknowledgement that the “number of dependents” 
variable does not provide information on the age distribution of dependents within the family 
unit. To at least partially assuage concerns regarding the proper measure of poverty (Couch and 
Pirog 2010), we incorporate the standard income-based threshold used by the U.S. government 
and supplement it by using near-poverty thresholds for 125 percent of poverty, equal to 1.25 × 
poverty threshold, and 150 percent of poverty, 1.5 × poverty threshold. City-level variables for 
DC unemployment rate, food insecurity, gross state product, family-size specific combined 
welfare cash and Food Stamp benefit, and the level of the city’s minimum wage supplement the 
tax data and are drawn from the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research (UKCPR) 
National Welfare Database. As mentioned in the previous section, we stratify the sample for 
married “joint” filers as well as head of household filers, referred to in the tables and subsequent 
text as “single parents.” We then restrict the data sample to tax filers reporting positive, 
nonmissing FAGI and earnings (wages, salaries, and tips) in each year of the 11-year panel. 
However, we do allow tax filers to drop out of the sample if they change filing status. We also 
drop observations with negative or missing values for wages or adjusted gross income. Whereas 
the full tax panel without balancing on positive FAGI and wages over 11 consecutive years 
contains 698,997 unique records, of which 86,131 are married filers and 162,393 are single-
parent filers, we are left with a sample of 63,365 unique tax filers, inclusive of all tax filing 
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types. Upon subsetting the data to married-filing jointly and household head tax filers, the data 
contain 16,354 unique married-filing jointly tax filers and 22,214 household head, or “single” tax 
filers.  
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the full data sample. The full sample of DC tax 
filing residents is relatively affluent, with mean earnings of $72,136 and FAGI equal to 
$124,919. The standard deviations for earnings (reported as wages in Table 3) and FAGI—
$475,800 and $1,076,240, respectively—provide a view of the dispersion of earnings and 
incomes throughout the sample. We also find that the average DC EITC recipient (federal EITC 
greater than zero in any year) has mean earnings and FAGI of $22,000 to $23,000 and a 
combined mean EITC receipt of over $3,000. The data include geocodes for tax filers, providing 
location information for the tax record including address, census block, census tract, 
neighborhood, and ward. Using this finer level of detail, we supplement the tax data with census 
tract-level data from the American Community Survey to better understand the demographic 
profile of census tracts where tax filers reside.1 The average recipient resides in a census tract 
that has higher poverty, lower marriage rates, a higher proportion of black residents, and lower 
educational attainment. In Figure 2 we compute the FAGI distribution for 2011 EITC recipients 
in DC, shown by quintile. Mean FAGI statistics by quintile are as follows: $4,748 in quintile 1; 
$9,899 in quintile 2; $14,241 in quintile 3; $21,208 in quintile 4; and $31,414 in quintile 5. The 
largest combined EITCs are refunded to persons with FAGIs in the third and fourth quintiles of 
EITC recipients, and mean FAGI from 2001 to 2011 in the third and fourth quintiles ranges from 
roughly $15,000 to $25,000. With respect to the geographic distribution of benefits, Appendix 
1 Beginning in 2010, the U.S. Census Bureau released ACS five-year estimates for all geographic areas 
down to census tract and block levels. Multiyear estimates released in consecutive years consist mostly of 
overlapping years and shared data. Based on ACS data, we created demographic variables for each DC census tract. 
We assign the 2005–2009 ACS data to IIT years 2006 and 2007, 2006–2010 ACS data to IIT year 2008, 2007–2011 
ACS data to IIT year 2009, and the 2008–2012 ACS data to IIT years 2010 and 2011.   
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Figure 1 examines EITC participation by ward, a political grouping of DC neighborhoods. As 
expected, Appendix Figure 1 reveals that EITC recipients cluster disproportionately in and 
around the eastern wards, historically the poorest in the city (Cowell and Mayer, forthcoming). 
As shown in Appendix Table 1, there is very little change between 2001–2008 and 2009–2011 
FAGI. It is noteworthy that earnings actually decline in the 2009–2011 period for the full sample 
relative to the 2001–2008 period, reflecting post-ARRA unemployment and the lagged economic 
contraction in and around the DC metropolitan area after 2009. Federal and DC EITC benefits 
rose, as did city-level measures of economic hardship.  
RESULTS 
Poverty and Near Poverty 
 In Tables 4–6, we examine the effect of the combined federal and DC EITC on poverty. 
These tables depict the full set of results, where the coefficients on Three+ Dep. × Eligible × 
ARRA depict the triple difference estimation strategy. The dependent variable compares net-
EITC income to the weighted average family-size adjusted poverty threshold. The first set of 
models (columns 1 and 2) estimates shorter-term poverty effects by examining the effect of a 
year t EITC increase on the likelihood of net-EITC income above poverty in year t + 1. The last 
two columns estimate the likelihood of net-EITC income above poverty in both years t + 1 and t 
+ 2 after a year t EITC increase. We view columns 3 and 4 as tests of a longer-term behavioral 
response, consistent with the literature on positive labor-supply effects from the EITC. 
Beginning with Table 4, for married and single family tax filers, the marginal effect of additional 
EITC yields no discernable effects on the likelihood of net-EITC income above poverty one year 
after the EITC increase. However, on a longer-term, two-year basis, we find that the combined 
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federal-DC EITC increase leads to a 1.7 percent higher likelihood of net-EITC income above the 
weighted average poverty threshold for single-parent filers. Most, if not all, of our independent 
variables fall within the unit interval, and our models are focused on the partial effect of the 
EITC (Wooldridge 2010).  
 In Tables 5–6 we estimate the effect of a larger EITC on the likelihood of net-EITC 
income above 125 and 150 percent of the weighted average poverty threshold, respectively. As a 
point of reference, the 2011 weighted-average poverty threshold for a family of three equals 
$17,916, 125 percent of poverty equals $22,395, and 150 percent of poverty equals $26,874. 
Figure 2 shows that, depending on family size, the third to fifth EITC quintiles include some 
workers with low income above the poverty line. In Table 5 we find that, like 100 percent of the 
poverty threshold, there is no effect on married families. However, single parent filers are 2.4 
percent more likely to have net-EITC income above 125 percent of poverty one year after the 
increased EITC, and 7.3 percent more likely over a two-year continuous basis following the 
increased EITC. The near-poverty effects of the EITC are larger than at 100 percent of poverty, 
illuminating the importance of examining the effectiveness of this policy using definitions of 
poverty and near poverty. In Table 6, we examine the likelihood of net EITC income above 150 
percent of the poverty threshold. Consistent with the models examining poverty at 125 percent of 
the poverty line, single-parent filers are about 2.4 percent more likely to have net EITC income 
above 150 percent of the poverty threshold one year out. From here, the antipoverty effects of the 
EITC become larger. Net EITC income among married filers is approximately 4 percent more 
likely to be above 150 percent of the poverty threshold and 9.0 percent more likely among 
single-parent filers two years out. To put these effects into context, for a family of three in 2009, 
identification occurs off of a marginal increase of $600 from the federal EITC and $251 from the 
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DC EITC, where the comparison is the $0.45 per dollar earned up to $5,657 under the newly 
formed EITC category of three or more dependent children versus $5,028 of federal EITC 
available under the previous top category for families, now applicable for those with 2 dependent 
children. 
Income Dynamics 
 Table 7 presents two sets of results on income dynamics. The first models (columns 1 and 
2) estimate the likelihood of earnings growth over a one year period. This is not only a direct 
exploration into earnings growth, but also an inquiry into the possibility of an hours worked 
effect from a larger EITC, given that hourly earnings among lower-skilled and less-educated 
workers appear stagnant over the 1990s and 2000s (Autor 2014; Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008; 
Hardy, Smeeding, and Ziliak 2015). The dependent variable for these models indicates whether 
or not year t + 1 earnings are greater than earnings in year t, and we find no evidence of earnings 
growth via larger EITCs.  
The second set of models in Table 7 (columns 3–4) estimate whether the year t EITC 
increase lowers the size of negative percent changes in year t adjusted gross income. Workers 
whose earnings fall between years should have their after-tax income supplemented in a 
progressive tax system, and if they fall into range, via the EITC (Hardy 2015; Hardy and Ziliak 
2014; Kniesner and Ziliak 2002). The dependent variable is conditioned for tax filers 
experiencing a one-year decline in FAGI, and columns 5–6 test the robustness of this result to 
using a lagged value of the EITC, to test whether last year’s t − 1 EITC, received in year t, 
reduces the absolute value of a negative FAGI percent change between years. We find that the 
both the current and previous year larger EITC raise the probability that the credit reduces a 
negative percent change in FAGI, approximately 6 percent more likely for married filers using 
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the current and previous years EITC, and 10.5 percent for single filers using the previous year 
EITC.  
City-level demographics are not of primary importance to the study, but a few general 
patterns emerge. First, the city’s unemployment rate is negatively associated with net-EITC 
income above poverty or near poverty, and larger welfare and Food Stamp benefits are positively 
associated with net-EITC income above poverty, though the magnitudes are small. Food 
insecurity is associated with lowered poverty, whereas minimum wages are associated with 
higher poverty.   
Isolating a Separate DC EITC Relationship 
 Throughout our discussion, identification has hinged on the one-time addition of a new 
EITC category for three or more children. This approach does not account for important, city-
level variation in the combined federal and local EITC over the 2000s occurring within DC. As 
depicted in Table 1, the DC EITC was enacted in 2000 at 10 percent of the federal credit, 
undergoing rate increases as a share of the federal credit equal to 25 percent in 2002, 35 percent 
in 2006, and 40 percent in 2009. To account for this variation over time, we estimate a linear 
probability model of net-EITC income above 100 percent of poverty, 𝑌𝑖𝑡, similar to the estimates 
depicted in Table 4. Here, we group tax filers into categories based upon their eligibility for the 
EITC, and whether the city’s EITC was either 10–25 percent, 35 percent, or 40 percent. These 
“rate” variables are in fact dichotomous variables based on the level of the DC EITC at a 
particular point in time. We define the 2001–2005 time period as our baseline omitted group, 
when the local credit was enacted for one year at 10 percent of the federal credit and quickly 
increased to 25 percent the next year. The relevant estimates derive from the interaction of credit 
level and eligibility. Our estimating model is as follows: 
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(2) 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛾𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡35 + 𝜗𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡40 + 𝜇𝐸𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡35 + 
  +𝜌𝐸𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡40 + 𝝉𝑿𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡. 
As with Equation (1), we control for city-level economic and demographic variables via 𝑿𝑡 as 
well as tax filer fixed effects 𝜑𝑖, measured with random error 𝑒𝑖𝑡. As shown in Table 8, we find 
that residents eligible for the EITC when the DC EITC is 35 percent of the federal credit are 
approximately 3 percent more likely to have net-EITC income above poverty, relative to the time 
period during which the DC credit equals 10–25 percent of the federal EITC. This holds for 
single parents one year out and both married and single parents two years out. During the 40 
percent DC EITC period, eligible residents are 7.7 (married) to 5.3 (single) percent more likely 
to have net-EITC income above poverty one year out, and 26.4 (married) to 15.3 (single) percent 
more likely to have net-EITC income above poverty two years out. The results here are 
consistent with those in our main poverty and near-poverty models in Tables 4–6, suggesting that 
increasingly generous EITC benefits are associated with lowered poverty.  
Robustness Checks Using Two Dependents 
 To test the robustness of our triple differences findings, we reestimate the empirical 
models in Tables 4–7 and impose the ARRA policy change on families with two dependents. If 
the recovery act expansion uniquely impacts families with three or more children, we can 
confirm that spillover effects or other secular policies did not impact other family types. In 
Appendix Tables 2–5, Two dep. ×  Eligible × ARRA displays the coefficient of interest. Testing 
the probability of net-EITC income above poverty, we find no evidence of antipoverty effects 
from the ARRA expansion for families with two children. In all of our robustness checks, 
families with three or more dependents are the omitted group. We proceed in Appendix Tables 
3–5 to test near-poverty effects and income dynamics for families with 2 dependents. At 125 
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percent of the weighted average poverty threshold (Appendix Table 3), we again find no 
evidence of any net-EITC effect on poverty for married or single filer families in the two child 
control sample. In Appendix Table 4, evidence emerges to suggest EITC near-poverty effects at 
150 percent of poverty are not robust for married filer families, where married filers with two 
dependents are anywhere from 5.5 to 3.9 percent more likely to have net-EITC income above 
poverty one and two years out, respectively. Importantly, our main estimates do appear to be 
robust for single-parent filers, and we initially find no evidence of antipoverty effects among 
married filers in Tables 4–6. This is an important result, as single parents display the largest 
near-poverty reduction from the EITC via Tables 5 and 6 and are a focal demographic group of 
concern in discussions of poverty alleviation (Currie 2006), given their overrepresentation 
among the poor (DeNavas-Walt and Proctor 2014).  
The $833 billion ARRA directed significant resources to America’s families in the form 
of expanded and extended unemployment insurance, which count as FAGI, as well as large 
expenditures via the Departments of Education, Transportation, and Health and Human Services 
for spending inclusive of K–12 education, highway maintenance, and Medicaid (Wilson 2012). 
There were also tax expenditures concurrent with EITC policy changes described here that 
impacted moderate income families. For example, in 2009 the Additional Child Tax Credit 
provides $1,000 for families, phasing out at $75,000 for single parents and $110,000 for married 
families that file taxes jointly. It is possible that, at 150 percent of poverty and beyond, these 
elements of the ARRA begin to take hold for moderate income married families as the EITC 
phases out (Altshuler et al. 2009; Sherman 2011). On the question of income stabilization, 
Appendix Table 5 suggests that current-year EITC income stabilization is robust among married 
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filer families (column 3), but that otherwise increased EITCs do not yield unique stabilization 
effects.  
Conclusion  
 Using rich administrative tax data and controlling for fixed effects, we find that the 
combined federal and DC EITC raise the likelihood of net EITC income above poverty and near 
poverty one and two years after an exogenous increase. Robust, large EITC antipoverty effects 
occur among single parents over a two-year period, ranging from a 2 (100 percent of poverty) to 
9 (150 percent of poverty) percent higher likelihood of net EITC income above poverty or near-
poverty. In our one-year models, we find a consistent 2 percent likelihood of net-EITC income 
above 125 and 150 percent of poverty for single-parent families. The determinants and 
underlying causes of shorter versus longer-term poverty spells may differ. Respectively, these 
can include temporary labor market shocks or less malleable individual-specific employment 
barriers related to job skills, discrimination, and networks (Berlin 2007; Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2004; Darity et al. 2012; Duncan and Rodgers 1988). With many individuals and 
families experiencing poverty over spells of two years or more (Bane and Ellwood 1986; 
Hokayem and Heggeness 2014), it is in this context that the two-year results are encouraging. 
They are consistent with the empirical literature on the EITC, suggesting positive labor supply 
effects, and qualitative research documenting recipient perceptions of the consumption and asset 
accumulation benefits of the EITC (Sykes et al. 2014). The antipoverty effects are robust for 
single filers from 100 through 150 percent of poverty. There is reason to believe that, at 150 
percent of poverty among married filers, other ARRA-era policies take hold, including 
unemployment insurance, state-level spending stimulus, and middle-class tax expenditures. The 
EITC reduces the magnitude of annual FAGI declines, though this result is only robust for 
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married families. Still, this may have important consequences for individual household 
consumption choices and is consistent with work examining the income volatility-reducing role 
of the EITC and other social welfare programs (Bitler, Hoynes, and Kuka 2014; Hardy 2015; 
Hardy and Ziliak 2014).  
The EITC has wide appeal because it increases extensive-margin work incentives on the 
phase-in range. Our evidence demonstrates that a large local EITC alongside the federal EITC 
can be an effective antipoverty intervention for the working poor. As with most policies, the 
EITC has limits to its effectiveness. With respect to poverty reduction, tax credits operating as 
wage subsidies do not supplement the incomes of jobless individuals, and some adults face 
structural and personal barriers that disconnect them from the labor market and, accordingly, 
refundable credits (Ben-Shalom, Moffitt, and Scholz 2012; Darity et al. 2014). Still, the large 
effects on poverty shown via a large supplement to the federal EITC merit consideration as part 
of a local poverty reduction plan. While it remains to be seen if the results in DC generalize, U.S. 
regions with similar economic, demographic, and income tax structures could consider such a 
policy, given nationwide take-up rates of 70–80 percent (Blumenthal, Erard, and Ho 2005; Jones 
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Figure 1  DC EITC Expenditures by Recipient Quintile, 2001–2011 
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Table 1  DC Refundable Earned Income Credit Policy Changes, 2000–2011 
Year Match rate/policy change 
2000 Legislative approval of refundable DC EITC 
2001 DC EITC initiated; level at 10% of federal credit 
2002 DC EITC level at 25% of federal credit 
2006 Expansion of EITC to noncustodial parents 
2006 DC EITC level at 35% of federal credit 
2009 DC EITC level at 40% of federal credit 
SOURCE:  DC Tax Facts, 2012. 
 
Table 2  Percent Lifted Above Poverty and Near-Poverty after DC and Federal EITC, 2001–2011 
 Percent poverty reduction Percent near-poverty reduction  
(125% of FPL) 
Percent near-poverty reduction  
(150% of FPL) 
 Single filers Married filers Single filers Married filers Single filers Married filers 
 DC Full DC Full DC Full DC Full DC Full DC Full 

































































































































































































































































































Table 3  Summary Statistics, 2001–2011 
Variables 
All filers EITC recipients 




Wages, salaries, tips (wages) 72,136.84 475,800.67 22,051.34 21,781.35 
FAGI 124,919.30 1,076,240.67 22,844.00 9,392.15 
DC EITC 99.15 309.41 754.73 482.81 
Federal EITC 307.03 936.70 2,280.68 1,430.88 
Single tax filer 









     
City-level characteristics     
     
D.C. unemployment rate 7.44 0.00 7.44 0.00 
Food insecure 13.55 0.00 13.55 0.00 












American Community Survey tract-level characteristics, 2006–2011 
     
Below poverty 0.15 0.11 0.24 0.13 
Married 0.54 0.20 0.40 0.15 
Black 0.51 0.38 0.77 0.26 
Hispanic 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.12 
Under 35 years old  0.48 0.10 0.52 0.10 
High school or less 0.23 0.15 0.35 0.10 
Female 0.53 0.05 0.54 0.05 
SOURCE: Summary statistics are inflation adjusted using personal consumption expenditures deflator for 2010. Census tract 
socio-economic characteristics are derived from geocoded American Communities Survey using tract-level data from 2005–
2009, 2006–2010, 2007–2011, and 2008–2012. Summary statistics for EITC recipients are constructed on condition that 
observation reports positive values for DC EITC. District of Columbia economic indicators compiled from UKCPR National 






Table 4  OLS Probability of FAGI plus EITC above Poverty Threshold 
 Above poverty one year out  Above poverty two years out 
 Married  Single  Married  Single 








































































































City-level characteristics     








































Observations 16,354 22,214 16,354 22,214 
R2 0.558 0.439 0.593 0.487 




Table 5  OLS Probability of FAGI plus EITC above 125 Percent of Poverty Threshold 
 Above poverty one year out  Above poverty two years out 
 Married  Single  Married Single 








































































































City-level characteristics     








































Observations 16,354 22,214 16,354 22,214 
R2 0.489 0.345 0.544 0.404 






Table 6  OLS Probability of FAGI Plus EITC Above 150 Percent of Poverty Threshold 
 Above poverty one year out  Above poverty two years out 
 Married  Single  Married Single 








































































































City-level characteristics     








































Observations 16,354 22,214 16,354 22,214 
R2 0.437 0.269 0.499 0.328 








Table 7  OLS Probability of Wage Growth and Income Stabilization 
 P(Earnings growth) P(EITC income stabilization) 
  Current year EITC One year EITC lag 
 Married Single Married Single Married Single 




























































































































































City-level characteristics       




























































Observations 16,354 22,214 16,354 22,214 16,354 22,214 
R2 0.081 0.130 0.056 0.071 0.104 0.057 








Table 8  OLS Probability of FAGI plus EITC above Poverty Threshold Using DC EITC Variation 
Variables 
Above poverty one year out  Above poverty two years out 









































City-level characteristics     








































Observations 16,354 22,214 16,354 22,214 
R2 0.549 0.432 0.548 0.454 





























Appendix Table 1  Mean Statistics Before and After 2009 ARRA 
Variables 
All filers Married EITC filers Household head EITC filers 
2001–2008 2009–2011 2001–2008 2009–2011 2001–2008 2009–2011 
Tax filer characteristics 
 
Wages, salaries, tips (wages) 72,226.70 71,897.24 22,695.81 22,658.79 22,888.64 23,621.44 
FAGI 123,574.40 128,505.80 24,789.93 25,900.15 23,283.81 24,454.38 
DC EITC 94.44 111.72 714.79 1083.20 701.04 973.20 
Federal EITC 317.23 279.83 2,340.88 2,698.75 2,346.18 2,438.45 
Single tax filer 













       
City-level characteristics 
 
      
Unemployment rate 6.48 10.00     
Food insecure 13.11 14.72     








    
SOURCE: Summary statistics are inflation adjusted using personal consumption expenditures deflator for 2010. Summary statistics for EITC recipients are constructed on 





Appendix Table 2  Robustness Check of FAGI plus EITC above the Poverty Threshold 
 Above poverty one year out  Above poverty two years out 
 Married  Single  Married Single 








































































































City-level characteristics     








































Observations 16,354 22,214 16,354 22,214 
R2 0.558 0.439 0.593 0.487 




Appendix Table 3  Robustness Check of FAGI plus EITC above 125% of Poverty Threshold 
 Above poverty one year out  Above poverty two years out 
 Married  Single  Married Single 








































































































City-level characteristics     








































Observations 16,354 22,214 16,354 22,214 
R2 0.489 0.344 0.541 0.398 







Appendix Table 4  Robustness Check of FAGI plus EITC above 150% of Poverty Threshold 
 Above poverty one year out  Above poverty two years out 
 Married  Single  Married Single 








































































































City-level characteristics     








































Observations 16,354 22,214 16,354 22,214 
R2 0.437 0.269 0.497 0.324 






Appendix Table 5  Robustness Check of OLS Probability of Wage Growth and Income Stabilization 
 P(Earnings growth) P(EITC income stabilization) 
  Current year EITC One year EITC lag 
 Married  Single  Married  Single  Married  Single  




























































































































































City-level characteristics       




























































Observations 16,354 22,214 16,354 22,214 16,354 22,214 
R2 0.081 0.130 0.056 0.071 0.104 0.057 
NOTE: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
